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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I

YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, j
LC, a Utah limited liability company,
I
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20080624-CA
CARLOS MARIN,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a 26 March 2008 Order of the Fourth District Court (Judge
Samuel McVey) granting Appellee Young Living Essential Oils, LC's motion for partial
summary judgment and denying Appellant Carlos Marin's motion for partial summary
judgment (R. 451-462), and the 12 June 2008 Final Judgment of the same lower court in
favor of Young Living awarding damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and
attorney's fees and costs, including the costs and fees expending collecting the judgment
and the costs of appeal (R. 500-505, 563-565).
Appellee Young Living Essential Oils, LC will be referred to herein as "Young
Living" and Appellant Carlos Marin as "Marin".
/////
/////

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j),
and to the Utah Supreme Court's Order effective 17 August 2008 transferring the case to
this Court.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing cannot circumvent the parol evidence rule to impose new,
independent duties in an expressly integrated written agreement?

This Court

reviews questions of law for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). This Court reviews the determination that an
agreement is integrated under a clearly erroneous standard. Bennett v. Huish, 155 P.3d
917, 925 (Utah App. 2007), citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, f 18, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah
2002).
Marin's Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment preserved this issue for review. (R. 119).
2. - 3. Did Marin preserve the attorney's fees and costs issues for review?
"To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised 'a timely and specific
objection' before the trial court. We will not address an issue if it is not preserved or if
the appellant has not established other grounds for seeking review." H. U.F. v. W.P. W.
P.3d

, 2009, WL 304711 (Utah 2009) {quoting State v. Low, 192 P.3d 867 (Utah

2008) (emphasis added) (Copy at Addendum 1).
"The standard of review on appeal of [the amount of) a trial court's award of
attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R &
2

R Group, Inc., 189 P.3d 114 (Utah App. 2008) (citing Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, %
127, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,
961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998)).
"A trial court's decision to award the prevailing party its costs will be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ^ 140, 130 P.3d
325, 351 (Utah 2005), quoting Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, f 4, 16 P.3d 549.
Marin did not preserve these issues for review.

His Objection to Plaintiffs

Proposed Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit (R. 499) was untimely filed. Rule 7(f)(2),
Utah R. Civ. P.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Summary Judgment - Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 26 July 2006, Plaintiff/Appellee Young Living Essential Oils, LC, a Utah
limited

liability

company

("Young

Living"),

filed

its

complaint

against

Defendant/Appellant Carlos Marin ("Marin"), for breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
quantum meruit, fraud, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
negligent misrepresentation in the Fourth District Court. (R. 1-23).
3

On 18 December 2006, Marin filed his Amended Answer. (R. 52-63).
On 21 March 2007, Young Living filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Breach of Contract Claim) (R. 74) with a supporting Memorandum and accompanying
affidavits (R. 69-72, 75-105). On 4 April 2007, Marin filed his Response to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 110119), with a supporting affidavit (R. 120-127). On 13 August 2007, Young Living filed
its Reply and Opposition to Defendant's Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(R. 130-170; see also Errata at R. 308-311), with supporting affidavits and declarations
(R. 171-287). On 27 August 2007, Marin filed his Reply (R. 293-295).
At a 1 October 2007 hearing on the motions, the trial court (Judge Samuel
McVey) granted Young Living's motion for partial summary judgment on its contract
claim and denied Marin's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 312). On 26
March 2008, the trial court signed the Order granting Young Living's motion for partial
summary judgment and denying Marin's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (R.
451-462).
On 27 May 2008, Young Living filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its remaining
claims against Marin, filed its affidavit of attorney's fees and costs (R. 463-495), and
submitted a proposed Final Judgment (R. 503-505).
On 11 June 2008, Marin filed an Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Final Judgment
and Fee Affidavit (R. 496-499).
On 12 June 2008, the trial court entered the Order dismissing Young Living's
remaining claims (R. 500-502) and entered its Final Judgment (R. 503-505).
4

On 14 July 2008, Marin filed his Notice of Appeal (R. 513-514).
On 4 November 2008, Young Living filed a Motion to Amend Final Judgment
Nunc Pro Tunc (to correct Young Living's correct name and corporate status from
"Young Living Essential Oils, Inc., a Utah Corporation" to "Young Living Essential Oils,
LC, a Utah limited liability company" on the caption of the Final Judgment to conform to
the caption on the Complaint) (R. 556-558). On 14 November 2008, the trial court
granted Young Living's motion (R. 561-562) and entered a Final Judgment Amended
Nunc Pro Tunc (R. 563-565).
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following undisputed facts are taken verbatim from the Court's 26 March 208
Order (R. 462-458) except that, pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, "Young Living" replaces "Plaintiff," and "Marin" replaces "Defendant" here:
At

Valid Contract
1. After negotiations, Plaintiff Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Young Living")

a Utah corporation, ultimately executed a written agreement ("Agreement") with
Defendant Carlos Marin ("Marin") on 12 January 2005.
2. In their Agreement, Marin expressly represented and warranted that he had
"significant experience as a Distributor/Leader", had "numerous contacts with potential
Distributor/Leaders" whom he could "bring to the Company and sign as new distributors
with the Company", and had "successful, favorable experience in providing Services
such as the duties as contemplated herein."
3.

Paragraph 18, the last paragraph of their Agreement directly above the
5

signature blocks, is labeled "Entire Agreement" (underline in original) and states in part:
"there are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in
connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein."
B.

Young Living's Obligations
4. Under paragraph 4 of their Agreement, Young Living agreed to pay Marin

advance payments of
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005);
$25,000 on 15 February 2005;
$25,000 on 15 March 2005, and
$25,000 on 15 April 2005.
5. According to their Agreement, these advances and other specified performance
bonuses were to help Marin devote "all his time and attention into [sic] recruiting
additional distributors underneath him and training them" and were expressly intended
"to entice [Marin] to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary time to it.
Also, [they] will provide him with a quick resource of cash to build the business."
6. Under paragraphs 4 and 4.1, these advanced amounts were to be offset by any
payments due Marin for commissions and "Fast Cash" bonuses.
7. Under paragraph 4.3, Young Living gave Marin a product credit of $5,000 for
January 2005, and $5,000 for February 2005 "to be used for samples in attracting new
Distributor/Leaders."
/////
/////

6

C

Marin's Obligations
8. Under paragraph 3.3 of their Agreement, Marin agreed to "devote his full time

and attention to recruiting new Distributor/Leaders" to sell Young Living's productsi
9. Under paragraph 3.4 of their Agreement, Marin agreed that he would meet the
following performance guarantees of cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the
specified dates:
$5,000 by 15 February 2005;
$30,000 by 15 March 2005;
$100,000 by 15 April 2005;
$300,000 by 15 May 2005;
$600,000 by 15 June 2005, and
$900,000 by 15 July 2005.
10. Paragraph 6.1 of their Agreement provides for Marin's payment of Young
Living's "loss and damage" and "legal fees" arising from "contravention . . . of any of the
terms and conditions imposed on [Marin] pursuant to this Agreement."
D*

Young Living's Performance and Marin's Breach
11. On 12 January 2005, in connection with the execution of their Agreement,

Young Living paid Marin a $25,000 advance.
12. On 15 February 2005, Marin met his $5,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales
volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
13.

Accordingly, on 15 February 2005, Young Living paid Marin another

$25,000 advance.
7

ship" sales volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
15. On 15 March 2005, Young Living paid Marin another $15,000 advance based
on Marin's representation that he would meet his 15 March 2005 perfonnance guarantee
of $30,000 in cumulative sales volume by 15 April 2005.
16. On 15 April 2005, Marin had failed to meet his 15 March 2005 $30,000 (let
alone his 15 April 2005 $100,000) cumulative "auto ship" sales volume performance
guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
17. Through June 2006, Marin had generated a grand total of less than $36,000 in
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume.
E.

Damages
18. Young Living paid Marin $65,000.00 in advances.
19. In 2005 and 2006, Marin earned a total of $3,637.57 in commissions from

Young Living.
20. Marin never earned "Fast Cash" bonus payments.
21. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that the "monies advanced to [Marin]
will be offset by any payments due [Marin] under the Fast Cash Program as calculated
below. Also, these payments will be offset by any commission payments due [Marin]
each month as calculated by the standard commission payout plan. . . .

If any of the

advanced amounts are not repaid by the commission payouts or Fast Cash at the end of
the guaranteed payments, these amounts will be deducted from any future commission
payout...."

8

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Marin argues that his admitted failure to meet agreed-upon performance
guarantees was excused because of Young Living's prior breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide "marketing tools" by a purported
deadline. As a result, Marin argues, this Court should reverse the trial court's order
granting Young Living's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim.
Marin makes three supporting arguments:
(1) He claims his affidavit raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether
there was an additional central oral term connected with the parties' written agreement;
(2) He claims the course of dealing between the parties should have been
considered in connection with whether Young Living breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; and
(3) He claims the parol evidence rule is not implicated by his affidavit since the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a part of every contract, and his
affidavit related to breach of that covenant and not to adding an oral term.
Marin's arguments are without merit based on a single dispositive undisputed
material fact, and a bright-line rule of law. The dispositive undisputed material fact: the
parties' contract contained a clear integration clause.
After the trial court ruled in this matter, the Utah Supreme Court announced a
bright-line dispositive rule that applies here: "[I]n the face of a clear integration clause,
extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not admissible on the question of

9

integration." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 f 17, 182 P„3d 326, 332
(Utah 2008).
Marin failed to preserve the attorney's fees and costs issues for appeal
VII. ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT, UNDER
EITHER THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING OR THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, MARIN'S AFFIDAVIT
WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO ADD A TERM TO THE PARTIES'
EXPRESSLY INTEGRATED WRITTEN AGREEMENT
Marin claims this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting Young

Living's motion for summary judgment for Marin's breach of contract because his
affidavit raised a genuine issue of material fact. Marin claims the disputed issue of fact is
whether Young Living orally agreed to supply Marin with the "marketing tools"
necessary for him to satisfy his performance guarantees.

Marin asserts that Young

Living's failure to supply such "marketing tools" by a purported deadline constituted "a
prior material breach of its obligation of good faith and fair dealing which excused Mr.
Marin from further performance under the Agreement, and specifically excused him from
his performance guarantees." (App. Br. 14-19).
Notwithstanding his assertions to the contrary, Marin offered his affidavit not as
evidence of the parties' course of dealing in connection with Young Living's covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, but as evidence of an additional term not included in the
parties' expressly integrated written agreement. The trial court correctly concluded that
Marin's affidavit was not admissible for that purpose under either the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing or the parol evidence rule.
10

1. This Court Can Summarily Affirm Based on a Single Undisputed Material
Fact and a Recent Dispositive Holding by the Utah Supreme Court. Since the trial
court ruled, the Utah Supreme Court announced a bright-line rule that is dispositive here.
Thus, Marin's appeal can be summarily disposed of based on a single undisputed material
fact and a single dispositive rule of law.
a.

The Dispositive Undisputed Material Fact:

The Parties' Contract

Contained a Clear Integration Provision. This is the last paragraph of the parties' 9page Agreement directly over Marin's signature:
Entire Agreement.
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and
contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the Parties, and there
are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties
in connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth
herein. No supplement, modification, amendment, waiver or termination of
this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing and signed by
the Parties hereto.. ..
(R. 6, copy at Addendum 2). As the trial court noted, Marin has failed to address,
explain, or dispute this or any other provision in his Agreement.

Indeed, Marin

acknowledged in the court below that this integration clause was part of a "valid"
Agreement and that the terms "are what they are".1
In short, this is a clear integration provision.

1

See R. 63 H 2 and 62 f 5; see also R. 118-119 ffi[ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R.
Civ. P. (R. 6 118 (emphasis added); R. 101 ^ 3; R. 118-119ffi[1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah
R. Civ. P.; cf R. 21ffi[10-11, 14; R. 63 % 2 and 621f 5).
11

b.

The Dispositive Rule of Law:

Where There Is A Clear Integration

Provision, No Extrinsic Evidence of a Separate Oral Agreement Is Admissible, In
May 2008, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held: "[I]n the face of a clear integration
clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not admissible on the question
of integration;' Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 \ 17, 182 P.3d 326, 332
(Utah 2008).2
The Utah Supreme Court's holding is dispositive here.

Since the parties'

Agreement contained a clear integration clause, Marin's affidavit is not admissible to add
an oral term to the parties' written agreement.
This Court should summarily affirm and award Young Living its fees and costs of
appeal.
2. Even Under Prior Law, the Trial Court Was Correct in Excluding Marin's
Affidavit as Evidence to Add an Oral Term to the Parties' Expressly Integrated
Written Agreement,
a. The Proper Legal Framework for Analysis. To determine whether the trial
court's conclusion was correct under the prior law, it is important to understand the
proper legal framework for analysis:
(1) Contract interpretation is a question of law: "[Interpretation of a contract
is a question of law." Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 561

2

Tangren applies retroactively: "The general rule from time immemorial is that the
ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and
prospectively." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). Marin carmot argue that
12

(Utah 1983), citing Morris v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah
1983).
(2) Threshold question: Is the agreement integrated? As a preliminary matter,
before a trial court can consider evidence of terms outside a parties' written agreement, it
must consider whether that agreement is integrated. Hall v. Process Instruments &
Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995) (Utah Supreme Court affirmed where trial
judge excluded parol evidence offered to add terms to a written agreement that was
complete on its face), citing Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
"An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings
as the final and complete expression of the agreement." Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT
App 361, Tfl7, 58 P.3d 854 (Utah App. 2002)(quotations and citation omitted).
(3) Whether a contract is completely integrated is a preliminary question that
may be resolved in summary judgment: AGI v. First Affiliated Securities, 912 F.2d
1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment affirmed where, under Utah law, trial
judge refused to consider parol evidence of purported additional oral terms of expressly
integrated written agreement).
(4) Admissibility and integration are questions of law: "Whether evidence is
admissible is a question of law, which we review for correctness, incorporating a clearly
erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of whether the
parties adopted a writing as a complete integration of their agreement." Bennett v. Huish,

he justifiably relied on prior decisions such as Hall since Marin argues that the parol
evidence rule does not even apply here. Id; App. Br. at 23.
13

155 P.3d 917, 925 % 18 (Utah App. 2007), citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, |18, 44
P.3d 742 (Utah 2002).
(5) The trial court considers all relevant evidence including the parties'
course of dealing to determine whether an agreement is integrated: Before Tangren,
a trial court was required to consider all relevant evidence, including the parties' course
of dealing, in determining whether an agreement was integrated. Hall v. Process
Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995).

If there is a clear

integration clause, the parties' course of dealing may not be used to add implied terms.
Indeed, the three "course of dealing" cases cited by Marin about implied terms
(App. Br. 19-23) are distinguishable: none of the contracts involved in those cases
contained an integration clause. See Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998); St.
Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 2001); Andalex
Resources, Inc. v Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994).
As the supreme court pointed out in Tangren, Hall did not contain an integration
clause either: "Thus, we were not presented with the issue we face in this case: whether
extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement regarding the contract is admissible in the
face of a clear integration clause." Tangren, 182 P.2d at 331 n.19. The supreme court
concluded: "To the extent our statements in Bullfrog Marina, Inc., Eie, Spears, and Hall
suggest that extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is admissible where the
contract contains a clear integration clause, we disavow them." Id.

14

(6) Is there ambiguity or fraud?

If an agreement is integrated, and if the

defendant fails to claim ambiguity or fraud, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add a
term to an integrated written contract. Hall, 890 P.2d at 1026-27.
(7) The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be construed to add
new terms to a parties5 agreement: "[T]he covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cannot be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the
parties." Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994),
citing Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 48, 55 (Utah 1991); accord Brown, 973 P.2d
at 955 ("a contrary holding would 'establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed
upon by the parties'").
b.
Evidence.

The Trial Court's Application of the Law:

Review of All Relevant

In applying this legal analysis, the trial court stated: "Based on all the

relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court concludes as a preliminary matter
that the parties intended their Agreement to be a complete integration and the final
expression of their agreement." (R. 455). The trial court's conclusion was correct.
(1) The Parties' Contract Contains An Express Integration Provision. The
trial court first noted that its determination was
based in part on the express integration provision direction over [Marin's]
signature in the Agreement itself which [Marin] has neither disputed nor
explained. Although not conclusive3, the Court finds this express provision
particularly persuasive.

As discussed above, the Tangren case now makes a clear integration clause conclusive:
"[I]n the face of a clear integration clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement
is not admissible on the question of integration." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008
15

Id. The trial court was referring to the last paragraph of the parties' 9-page Agreement:
Entire Agreement.
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and
contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the Parties, and there
are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties
in connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth
herein. No supplement, modification, amendment, waiver or termination of
this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing and signed by
the Parties hereto.. ..
(R. 6, copy at Addendum 2). As the trial court noted, Marin has failed to address,
explain, or dispute this or any other provision in his Agreement.

Indeed, Marin

acknowledged in the court below that this integration clause was part of a "valid"
Agreement and that the terms "are what they are".4 As discussed above, since Tangren
the existence of this clear integration clause is now dispositive and would end the
analysis:

no extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement would be admissible.

Tangren, 2008 UT 20 ] 17, 182 P.3d 326, 332 (Utah 2008).
(2) It Is Unreasonable That Such A Crucial Term Would Be Omitted. The
trial court also noted that
the Agreement itself sets out in detail the rights and obligations of the
parties, including various deadlines for their performance. It therefore begs
the question: if, as [Marin] contends, the purported term that [Young
UT 20 U 17, 182 P.3d 326, 332 (Utah 2008). But Tangren was decided after the trial
court's ruling.
4

See R. 63 1 2 and 62 Tf 5; see also R. 118-119 ^ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R.
Civ. P. (R. 6 If 18 (emphasis added); R. 101 f 3; R. 118-119 ^ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah
R. Civ. P.; c f R . 21ffif10-11, 14; R. 63 f 2 and 6215).
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Living] breached was so critical to [Marin's] performance, why was it not
included in the parties' Agreement?
(R. 455.)
(3) The Parties' Course of Dealing Belies Marin's Current Assertions and
Confirms that Young Living Acted in Good Faith. As for the parties' course of
dealing, the trial court noted that
the email communications between [Marin] and [Young Living] submitted
to the Court are devoid of any reference by [Marin] to [Young Living's]
breach of this purported critical term. The Court finds particularly
persuasive an email exchange between [Marin] and [Young Living's]
general counsel on February 3, 2005, two days after the deadline [Marin]
contends that Plaintiff was to provide promised "marketing tools". Instead
of complaining about how [Young Living's] recent breach would prevent
his further performance, [Marin] represented that he could expand [Young
Living's] business into several foreign markets. Indeed, in the submissions
before the Court, there is no written notice of the purported breach to give
[Young Living] the contractually-required 10-day opportunity to cure.
(R. 455-454). The trial court added:
The Court notes that oral representations of additional terms have been
accepted by other courts notwithstanding an integration clause in a written
agreement. But those cases are most often in the context of a construction
contract where the performance of the parties manifests their agreement or
consent to "extras" beyond a written agreement. Therefore, those cases are
distinguishable.
(R. 454). In addition, the undisputed facts disclose that, in compliance with its obligation
of good faith and fair dealing, and based on Marin's assertion that he would make up for
his admitted breach of a performance guarantee, Young Living paid an advance to Marin
after Marin's breach (IflU4. and 15., supra at 7-8).
(4) Marin's Assertions About A Purported Oral Agreement Are Indefinite
and Unclear, The trial court also identified that Marin's "assertions of [Young Living's]
17

representations lack foundation as to the circumstances including who made the
purported representation or representations and when such representations were made.v
Id. Marin's assertions were also directly contradicted by the affidavits of the Young
Living executives who would have made the claimed representations. (R. 173, 179-180.)
The trial court concluded:
In sum, based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the
Court rejects [Marin's] assertions that the parties intended to be bound by terms
not found in their written Agreement and concludes as a threshold matter that the
parties' Agreement was integrated.
Id.
(5) Marin's Reliance on The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is
Misplaced. Finally, the trial court concluded that Marin's claim of Young Living's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "is misplaced" since "[i]t is
well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to
impose new, independent duties in a written agreement." (R. 456). In Ihis regard, the
trial court quoted Slicex, Inc. v. Aeroflex Colorado Springs, Inc., 2006 WL 2927768
(D.Utah) n.l:
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is "implied in contracts
'to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract'" ... '[T]he
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not serve to import new
obligations into a contract. It merely controls how the obligations stated
within the contract are to be performed.'"
(Case cites omitted) (Copy at Addendum 3).
(6) Marin's Claims Necessarily Implicated the Parol Evidence Rule. The trial
court also concluded that Marin's claim that Young Living "breached a purported oral

ia

term necessarily implicates the parol evidence rule." Id. The trial court then quoted Hall,
890 P.2d at 1026-1027, noting "[i]t is well settled that"
the [parol evidence] rule operates, in the absence of fraud or other
invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous
conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract.
Id. (italics in original; citing inter alia Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192
(Utah 1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 213-14 (1981)). (R. 456).
(7) Marin Made No Claim of Fraud or Ambiguity. Since Marin did not claim
either fraud or ambiguity, the trial court correctly concluded that his "assertions offered
for the purpose of adding to the terms of the parties' integrated Agreement must be
excluded. Hah, 890 P.2d at 1026-27." (R. 454).
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded under both the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and the parol evidence rule that, based on all of the relevant
evidence in the record, Marin's affidavit was not admissible to add a term to the parties'
integrated Agreement. Since the trial court's conclusion was correct, and its finding that
the parties' Agreement was integrated was not clearly erroneous, this Court should affirm
the award of summary judgment against Marin on Young Living's breach of contract
claim and the final judgment.
B.

MARIN FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
FOR APPEAL
The Utah Supreme Court recently instructed
[t]o preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised "a timely
and specific objection" before the trial court. We will not address an issue
19

if it is not preserved or if the appellant has not established other grounds for
seeking review.
K U.F. v. W.P. W.

P.3d

, 2009, WL 304711 (Utah 2009) (quoting State v. Low,

192 P.3d 867 (Utah 2008) (emphasis added) (Copy at Addendum 1).
In this case, Marin did not raise a timely objection to Young Living's Proposed
Judgment or to Young Living's Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Pursuant to Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), "[objections to the proposed order' shall be filed
within five days after service." Here, Young Living filed and served its Proposed Final
Judgment and Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees on 27 May 2008. (R. 505, 492). Following
this Marin was allowed five (5) days, plus three (3) days for service by mail (Rule 6(e)),
by which to file any objection to the Proposed Final Judgment including the Affidavit of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, making any objection due on 6 June 2008. Marin did not file
his objection with the trial court until 11 June 2008. (R. 499).
Thus, Marin did not timely object to Young Living's Proposed Final Judgment
and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs. By failing to do so, Marin failed to preserve
the issue of the reasonableness of Young Living's attorney's fees for appeal.
C.

MARIN FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF COSTS FOR APPEAL
As detailed above, Marin did not timely file an objection to Plaintiffs Proposed

Final Judgment or Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs and therefore did not preserve
the issue of costs for appeal.
Moreover, even under the more expansive Rule 54 d(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil

5 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 defines "Judgment" as used in the rules as a
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Procedure, Marin failed to timely object to the itemized bill of costs. Under Rule 54 d(2),
"[a] party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court."
As noted above, Marin did not file his objection to the Proposed Final Judgment or
Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs until 11 June 2008, some 15 days after being served
with Plaintiffs Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs. (R. 499).
Based on Rules 6(a) and 6(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any objection to the
costs bill was required to be filed by 9 June 2008. Because Marin did not timely file his
objection to costs, the issue of costs has not been preserved for appeal.
In any event, even if the Court finds Marin did preserve this issue, the Agreement
between the parties provided for the recovery of all costs, charges and expenses.
Paragraph 6.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:
MARIN herby agrees to indemnify and save Company and hold harmless
Company in respect to all causes of action, liabilities, costs, charges and
expenses, loss and damage (including consequential loss) suffered or
incurred by Company (including legal fees) arising from any willful or
grossly negligent act or omission of MARIN or his employees, servants and
agents or arising from contravention by MARIN of any of its employees
servants and agents of any of the terms and conditions imposed on MARIN
pursuant to this Agreement.
(R. 9; emphasis added). Thus, even if Marin preserved this issue for appeal, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding as costs Young Living's expenditures for
photocopies, overnight mail, courier, postage, and online research.

Based on the

language of the Agreement, Plaintiff is entitled to collect all costs, charges and expenses

decree and any order from which an appeal lies.
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related to Marin's contravention of the terms and conditions imposed on Marin pursuant
to the Agreement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Under both Tangren and the controlling law at the time it ruled, the trial court
properly ruled that Marin's affidavit was could not be admitted to add an oral term to the
parties' expressly integrated written agreement.
Marin did not preserve the attorney's fees and costs issues for appeal.
The trial court should be affirmed, and Young Living should be awarded its costs
and fees, including on appeal.

( $y
Respectfully submitted thisvPjfaay of April 2009.
FILLMORE SPENCER LLL

•£*-

Jarnard N. Madsen
Attorneys for Appellee Young Living
Essential Oils, LC
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Feb 10,2009
Background: Putative father filed motion to intervene in adoption proceeding Following a hearing,
the Fourth District, Provo Department, Lynn W
Davis, J, granted adoptive parent's motions to dismiss and strike putative father's motion to intervene, and putative father appealed The Court of
Appeals certified the case for immediate transfer
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durrant, Associate
C J , held that
(1) putative father's arguments on appeal were not
moot,
(2) putative father did not comply with Arizona requirements to preserve his parental rights, as required in order to qualify for exception to Utah statute that denied putative fathers who did not register
with Office of Vital Statistics the right to contest
adoptions,
(3) evidence was sufficient to establish that putative
father had reason to believe that mother had moved
to Utah and thus was required to register with Office of Vital Statistics in order to preserve his parental rights and intervene in the adoption proceeding,
(4) Arizona paternity order was entitled to full faith
and credit, but
(5) error of trial court in concluding that Arizona
order was not entitled to full faith and credit was
harmless, as such order had no bearing on putative
father's right to challenge adoption,
(6) trial court could make findings of fact without
providing putative father with an evidentiary hearing, and
(7) putative father's appeal was not frivolous
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[1] Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
3 OXVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k In General Most
Cited Cases
Supreme Court review a district court's interpretation of a statute for correctness
[2] Appeal and Error 30 €^>1008.1(5)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General
30kl008 I In General
30kl008 1(5) k Clearly Erroneous Findings Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews a district court's findings of
fact under a clearly erroneous standard
[3] Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k In General Most
Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews a district court's ruling regarding a statute's constitutionality for correctness
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[4] Appeal and Error 30 €=>843(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XV1(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k843 Matters Not Necessary to Decision on Review
30k843(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
An argument is moot on appeal if the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.
[5] Adoption 17 €==>15
17 Adoption
17k9 Judicial Proceedings
17k 15 k. Review. Most Cited Cases
Putative father's arguments on appeal of trial court
orders regarding his attempt to intervene in adoption proceeding were not moot on the ground that
he only addressed trial court's order granting adoptive parents' motion to dismiss putative father's motion to intervene and did not address trial court's order granting adoptive parent's motion to strike motion to intervene based on putative father's false assertions, where putative father in his opening brief
challenged trial court's finding that putative father
had knowledge that birth mother was in Utah, and,
though putative father did not explicitly state he
was challenging the motion to strike, the challenge
was substantially briefed.
[6] Adoption 17 €=>15
17 Adoption
17k9 Judicial Proceedings
17k 15 k. Review. Most Cited Cases
Putative father did not preserve for appeal a due
process challenge and equal protection challenge, in
his appeal of trial court order dismissing and striking his motion to intervene in adoption proceeding,
where putative father's motion to intervene in the
trial court did not raise a due process or equal protection challenge, and trial court's rulings did not

© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest.
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consider a due process or equal protection challenge. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
14; Rules
App.Proc. Rule 24(a).
[7] Appeal and Error 30 €=>169
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30k 169 k. Necessity of Presentation in
General. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court will not address an issue if it is not
preserved or if the appellant has not established
other grounds for seeking review. Rules App.Proc,
Rule 24(a).
[8] Adoption 17 € ^ 7 . 2 ( 3 )
17 Adoption
17k7 Consent of Parties
17k7.2 Natural Parents, Necessity of Consent
in General
17k7.2(3) k. Illegitimate Children. Most
Cited Cases
Putative father, who resided in Arizona where
mother also resided and failed to register with Utah
Office of Vital Statistics, failed to comply with the
most stringent and complete Arizona statutory requirements to preserve his parental rights, as required in order to qualify for exception to Utah statute that denied putative fathers who did not register
with Office of Vital Statistics the right to contest
adoptions; Arizona statute required a putative father
to initiate a paternity action within 30 days of receiving notice that a birth mother intended to give a
child up for adoption, birth mother served putative
father with notice stating that if he wished to assert
his parental rights he "must" start a paternity action
within 30 days, notice putative father received was
not ambiguous, and putative father did not start his
paternity action in Arizona within 30 days of receipt of the notice. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4.14
(Repealed); A.R.S. § 8-106(G).
[9] Statutes 361 €=>188
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161 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 k In General Most Cited
Cases
When interpreting a statute, courts look first to the
statute's plain language to determine its meaning
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361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36Ik 180 Intention of Legislature
361kl81 In General
36Ik 181 (2) k Effect and Consequences Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €^>206

(10] Statutes 361 €^>205
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k205 k In General Most Cited
Cases
Statutes 361 €=>208
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
36IV 1(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k208 k Context and Related
Clauses Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €=>223.2(.5)

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k206 k Giving Effect to Entire
Statute Most Cited Cases
When interpreting a statute, courts seek an interpretation that renders all parts of a statute relevant
and meaningful, and interpretations are to be
avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd
[12] Appeal and Error 30 €=>1008.1(5)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(1) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General
30kl008 1 In General
30k 1008 1(5) k Clearly Erroneous Findings Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court will overturn a district court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 Vl(A) General Rules of Construction
361k223 Construction with Reference to
Other Statutes
361k223 2 Statutes Relating to the
Same Subject Matter in General
361k223 2(5)k In General Most
Cited Cases
When interpreting a statute, courts read the plain
language of a statute as a whole and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the
same statute and with other statutes under the same
and related chapters

17 Adoption
17k7 Consent of Parties
17k7 8 Evidence
17k7 8(3) Weight and Sufficiency
17k7 8(4) k Necessity of Consent in
General Most Cited Cases

[11] Statutes 361 €^>181(2)

Adoption 17 €^>11
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[13] Adoption 17 €=>7.8(4)
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17 Adoption
I7k9 Judicial Proceedings
17kll k Petition and Parties Most Cited
Cases
Evidence was sufficient to establish, at hearing on
adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike putative father's motion to intervene m Utah adoption
proceeding, that putative father, who resided in Arizona where birth mother also resided, had reason to
know that mother moved to Utah, and thus that putative father was required to register with Utah Office of Vital Statistics in order to preserve his parental rights and intervene in the adoption proceeding, though mother sent e-mail to putative father
one week after she obtained protective order against
him in Arizona denying that she moved to Utah,
father in open court at hearing on mother's request
for protective order testified that she told him she
moved to Utah
U C A 1953, 78-30-4 14
(Repealed)
[14] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H €=>64
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock
76HV Paternity Proceedings
76Hk63 Judgment or Order
76Hk64k In General Most Cited Cases
Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H €^>68
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock
76HV Paternity Proceedings
76Hk63 Judgment or Order
76Hk68 k Operation and Effect Most
Cited Cases
Arizona paternity order, finding that putative father
was the biological father, complied with Arizona
requirements for a judgment, for purposes of determining whether the order was entitled to full
faith and credit when putative father sought to intervene in Utah adoption proceeding, though order
was not executed by a judge and copy provided to
Utah court was not certified, Arizona law only required that the judgment be in writing and signed
by a judge or a court commissioner duly authorized
to do so, and paternity order was m writing and
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signed by a deputy clerk U S C \ Const Art 4, §
1, 16 A R S Rules Civ Proc , Rule 58(a)
[15] Judgment 228 €^>815
228 Judgment
228XVII Foreign Judgments
228k814 Judgments of State Courts
228k815 k Adjudications Operative in
Other States Most Cited Cases
As to matters of jurisdiction, a judgment is entitled
to full faith and credit if the same issue as to jurisdiction was raised m the foreign court and adjudicated therein U S C A Const Art 4, § 1
[16] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H €^>68
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock
76HV Paternity Proceedings
76Hk63 Judgment or Order
76Hk68 k Operation and Effect Most
Cited Cases
Arizona order of paternity regarding putative father
was entitled to full faith and credil, when putative
father sought to intervene in Utah adoption proceeding, though the Arizona court determined that
it lacked jurisdiction to determine custody as the
child did not reside in Arizona and had not resided
in Arizona in the previous six months, as a lack of
jurisdiction over custody did not equate to a lack of
jurisdiction over a paternity determination, and the
Arizona court took testimony, considered its jurisdiction regarding paternity and determined that the
putative father was the biological lather U S C A
Const Art 4, § 1, A R S
§§ 8-106(G),
25-1002(3)(a), 25-1031
[17] Adoption 17 €=>15
17 Adoption
17k9 Judicial Proceedings
17kl5k Review Most Cited Cases
Error of Utah court, when it granted adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike putative father's
motion to intervene in adoption pioceedmg, in concluding that Arizona paternity order was not en-
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titled to full faith and credit, was harmless error, as
the Arizona paternity order had not bearing on putative father's right to contest the adoption, under
Arizona the law the right to contest paternity was a
separate and distinct right from the right to contest
an adoption, and the Arizona court concluded that it
did not have jurisdiction to determine custody
U S C A Const Art 4, § 1, A R S ^ 8-106(G)
[18] Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 1 0 2 6
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(J) Harmless Error
30XVI(J)1 In General
30U025 Prejudice to Rights of Party
as Ground of Review
30kl026k In General Most Cited
Cases
Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that
it affected the outcome of the proceedings
[19] Adoption 17 €^>7.2(3)
17 Adoption
17k7 Consent of Parties
17k7 2 Natural Parents, Necessity of Consent
in General
17k7 2(3)k Illegitimate Children Most
C ited Cases
Under Arizona law, the right to contest paternity is
distinct from the right to contest an adoption, as a
putative father may establish paternity at any time,
but he may only establish the right to contest an adoption if (1) he initiates a paternity action within
30 days of receiving notice of a planned adoption,
and (2) that action results in a paternity order
A R S §8-106(G)
[20] Adoption 1 7 € ^ 1 1
17 Adoption
17k9 Judicial Proceedings
17k 11 k Petition and Parties Most Cited
Cases
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Trial court could make findings of fact, in hearing
on adoptive parents' motion to dismiss and strike
putative father's motion to intervene in adoption
proceeding, without holding an evidentiary hearing,
where the trial court provided the parties the opportunity to present evidence, counsel for putative
father requested that the matter be argued only on
the law and objected to an evidentiary argument,
the parties did not present any evidence, and the trial court relied on facts in the record to make its
findings Rules Civ Proc , Rule 43(b)
[21] Costs 102 € ^ 2 6 0 ( 5 )
102 Costs
102X On Appeal or Error
102k259 Damages and Penalties for Frivolous Appeal and Delay
102k260 Right and Grounds
102k260(5) k Nature and Form of
Judgment, Action, or Proceedings for Review Most
Cited Cases
Putative father's appeal of trial court order granting
adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike putative father's motion to intervene in adoption proceeding was not frivolous, and thus adoptive parents were not entitled to their attorney fees on appeal, though putative father did not prevail, Supreme Court found that putative father's appeal was
not moot as argued by adoptive parents, though putative father failed to preserve two issues he raised
on appeal he raised other issues that were properly
before the Supreme Court, putative father's argument that had no reason to know that mother was in
Utah was not made in bad faith, and putative father's challenge to the lack of an evidentiary hearing
was made in good faith Rules App Pioc , Rule
33(b)
Hutch U Falc, Provo, Nathan E Burdsal, Salt Lake
City, for petitioners
H Mifflin Williams, III, Salt Lake City, Claudia
McGee Henry, Los Angeles, CA, for respondent
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On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
*1 U 1 In this case, W.P.W. ("Putative Father")
challenges the adoption of Baby Girl Stine
("B.G.S."), arguing that the district court erred in
ordering the adoption of B.G.S. without his consent. H.U.F. and G.F. ("Adoptive Parents") defend
the district court's order by arguing that the Putative
Father's consent to the adoption was not necessary
because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements that give a putative father the right to
contest an adoption.
K 2 Specifically, the parties raise the following issues on appeal:
(1) Whether the Putative Father's appeal is moot because he appealed only one of two dispositive orders;
(2) Whether Utah's statutory scheme for adoptions
violated the Putative Father's due process and
equal protection rights, and whether these constitutional challenges were preserved;
(3) Whether the Putative Father complied with Utah
Code section 78-30-4.14, which establishes the
requirements a putative father must meet before
he may contest an adoption;
(4) Whether the district court should have granted
full faith and credit to Arizona's Paternity Order;
(5) Whether the district court should have held an
evidentiary hearing; and
(6) Whether the Putative Father's appeal is frivolous, warranting the award of attorney fees to the
Adoptive Parents.
H 3 We affirm the district court's decision.

BACKGROUND
f 4 On or about September 22, 2005, while the
Birth Mother was pregnant with B.G.S., she served
two men with notice that she intended to place her
baby for adoption through LDS Family Services in
Mesa, Arizona. The notice stated that if its recipient
wished to assert parental rights to the baby, he was
required to initiate a paternity action pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106 within thirty
days of receipt of the notice. The notice also included the full text of Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106. In addition, the Birth Mother published
public notices in Arizona newspapers four times
over a period of four weeks between September and
October 2005. The public notices were addressed
to, "William Patrick Wilks or Nathaniel Davis or
John Doe."
K 5 In response, the Putative Father filed a Notice
of Claim of Paternity with the Arizona Office of
Vital Records on September 29, 2005. This filing
placed the Putative Father's name on the Putative
Father Registry in Arizona. As a registrant, the Putative Father had the right to be identified by the vital statistics office if the office were to receive a
search letter regarding the child whom the Putative
Father claimed he fathered. Thereafter, the entity
assisting in the placement of the child for adoption
would be responsible for notifying the Putative
Father of any legal proceedings regarding the child.
The vital statistics office indicated in a letter to the
Putative Father that he must follow the provisions
of Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106 to establish paternity.
f 6 In February 2006, the Birth Mother filed a petition with an Arizona justice court seeking a protective order against the Putative Father. A hearing was
held on the matter on February 7. At the hearing,
counsel representing the Birth Mother stated that
the Birth Mother "went to Utah to get away from
[the Putative Father], and to be up there, and that's
where she is, and there's no need for [the Putative
Father] to be allowed to harass her."The Putative
Father responded, "Yes, um [the Birth Mother] told
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me when she moved to Utah "
*2 T| 7 The Putative Father never registered with the
Utah Office of Vital Statistics as a putative father
f 8 On February 15, 2006, one hundred and fortyfive days after being served with notice that the
Birth Mother intended to place her baby for adoption, the Putative Father filed a petition for paternity with the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa
County Because the Putative Father failed to properly serve the Birth Mother, the petition was not
granted
H 9 B G S was born in Utah on March 4, 2006
Two days later, in the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah, the Birth Mother willingly relinquished all
of her parental rights and responsibilities to the Adoptive Parents The Birth Mother also stated to the
district court that she was not, nor had she ever
been, married to the natural father of B G S and
that the identity of the father was unknown Further, she stated that the natural father had not initiated a paternity action m Utah, despite having actual notice that the Birth Mother had moved to Utah
FN1
and planned to give birth to the baby in Utah
K 10 On March 15, 2006, the Adoptive Parents filed
a petition for temporary custody and guardianship
and a verified petition for adoption, wherein they
indicated that "[p]ursuant to Utah Code Ann §
78-30-4 14, the consent of the natural mother is the
only consent required in order for the Court to grant
the instant petition "They further stated that the
presumed natural father had actual notice and
knowledge that the Birth Mother resided m Utah
and that she intended to give birth in Utah They
also stated that the presumed natural father had not
registered with the Office of Vital Statistics in the
Utah Department of Health, nor had he begun a paternity proceeding in the State of Utah On March
17, 2006, the district court granted the Adoptive
Parents "full and complete custody and guardianship of [B G S ] until such time when the Court issues a final order concerning Petitioner's Petition
for Adoption "
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f 11 On April 11, 2006, the Putative Father again
petitioned the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa
County for a declaration of paternity Again, he
failed to properly serve the Birth Mother
K 12 On July 25, 2006, in the Superior Court of Arizona, the Putative Father filed a Voluntary Petition
for Order of Paternity signed by the Birth Mother
In an order dated August 2, 2006, the Arizona court
"note[d]" that this voluntary petition "resolv[ed] the
paternity issue " The court also noted that it lacked
jurisdiction to determine custody or child support
and ordered that the matter be transferred to Utah
for further proceedings
H 13 On July 27, 2006, the Putative Father requested that the Utah court open the sealed Utah file regarding the adoption proceedings Then, in the Utah
court on September 1, 2006, the Putative Father
filed an mtervenor's response to the petition for adoption In an affidavit filed with the court, the Putative Father stated that the Birth Mother told him
"verbally and by e-mail
that she would not give
affiant's baby up for adoption and that she would
always keep in touch with affiant "Further, the Putative Father stated in the affidavit that he "had no
knowledge whatsoever, and received no notice
whatsoever that [the Birth Mother] resided in Utah
and intended to give birth to [B G S ] in Utah "
*3 f 14 On August 31, 2006, and again on November 27, 2006, the Birth Mother submitted an affidavit stating to the Utah court that she never gave
the Putative Father notice that she had moved to
Utah or planned to give birth in Utah With the
second affidavit, the Birth Mother included an email that she had sent to the Putative Father on February 14, 2006, one week following the protective
order hearing The e-mail stated, "[my parents]
made me tell all my friends and some family that I
moved to Utah when I really didn't, nor do I have
any intentions of moving to Utah "
K 15 On December 12, 2006, the Adoptive Parents
moved to dismiss the Putative Father's objection to
the adoption and motion to intervene On February
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2, 2007, the district court held a hearing on the matter Counsel for the Putative Father requested that
the matter be argued only on the law and objected
to an evidentiary argument The court declined to
determine the type of hearing and, instead, left the
matter up to counsel At the hearing, the parties did
not present any evidence The Putative Father was
present, but his counsel did not call him to testify
K 16 On April 17, 2007, the district court issued one
ruling that granted the Motion to Strike and the Motion to Dismiss In the ruling, the district court
barred the affidavits submitted by the Birth Mother,
finding that they contradicted "the law of the case"
and were obtained unethically Next, the court declined to give full faith and credit to the Arizona
court's statement regarding the Putative Father's paternity, finding that the Arizona court lacked jurisdiction to issue an order of paternity, the court also
highlighted additional problems with the order itself Finally, the court ruled that the Putative Father
failed to comply with the Utah statutory requirements for out-of-state putative fathers Accordingly, the court ruled that the Putative Father
"lackfed] standing to challenge this adoption," and
"Petitioners' Motion to Strike the Objection and to
Dismiss the Motion to Intervene is hereby granted "
K 17 The Putative Father appealed, and the court of
appeals heard oral argument in the case After oral
argument, but before any decision issued m this
case, the court of appeals issued a split decision in
FN2
In re KC I
Concerned that its decision in this
case might conflict with its decision m KCJ the
court of appeals certified this case for immediate
transfer to us, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 43(a) In KCJ, the court of appeals
held that where the district court becomes aware of
a putative father's interest and desire to participate
in the adoption proceeding, the court should allow
the father to participate, at least to the extent of litigating the legitimacy of his right to contest the adoption
We need not reach the issue presented
in KCJ, however, because the Adoptive Parents
have not challenged the Putative Father's right to

adjudicate whether he may contest the adoption of
B G S Rather, the Adoptive Parents make substant
lve arguments regarding whether the Putative Fath
er has the right to contest the adoption
*4 ^ 18 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
section 78A-3-102(3)(b) (2008)
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[l][2][3]f 19 The Putative Father challenges the
district court's interpretation of Utah and Arizona
statutes, the district court's finding that the Putative
Father failed to comply with Utah and Arizona stat
utes, and the constitutionality of Utah's statutory re
quirements for putative fathers to establish parental
rights We review a district court's interpretation of
a statute for correctness
We leview a district
court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard
And we review a distnct court's ruling
regarding a statute's constitutionality for correct
FNo
ness
ANALYSIS
f 20 As threshold issues, we first address (1)
whether the Putative Father's appeal is moot, and
(2) whether the Putative Fathei preserved a due
process and an equal protection challenge Holding
that the appeal is not moot but that the Putative
Father failed to preserve a due process and an equal
protection challenge, we then address (3) whethei
the Putative Father complied with Utah Code sec
tion 78-30-4 15 (2005),
and (4) whether the
district court should have given full faith and credil
to the Arizona court's paternity order Finally, we
turn to (5) whether the district ccurt should have
held an evidentiary hearing, and (6) whether the Putative Father's appeal is frivolous, warranting attorney fees
I THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S CLAIMS ARE
NOT MOOT BECAUSE HE CHALLENGED THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S
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ONLY RULING
[4]K 21 An argument is moot "[i]f the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the
litigants "
[5jfl[ 22 The Adoptive Parents argue that the Putative Father's arguments on appeal are moot because
they only address one of two dispositive orders by
the district court Particularly, the Adoptive Parents
argue that the Putative Father only contests the district court's order granting the Motion to Dismiss
Alleged Biological Father's Objection and Motion
to Intervene ("Motion to Dismiss"), without contesting the district court's order granting the Motion
to Strike the Objection and Motion to Intervene
("Motion to Strike") The Adoptive Parents state
that these motions served different purposes The
Motion to Dismiss asserted that the Putative Father
failed to establish "that he is entitled to any interest
or right to intervene "The Motion to Strike asserted
that the Putative Father's attempt to intervene was
FN9
based upon a false assertion of a material fact
and should therefore be stricken
K 23 The Putative Father argues in his reply brief
that in his opening brief he did challenge the court's
order granting the Motion to Strike In his opening
brief, the Putative Father challenged the district
court's finding that the Putative Father had knowledge that the Birth Mother was in Utah Although
this challenge to the Motion to Strike is not exphcit-nowhere does the Putative Father state that he is
challenging the Motion to Stnke-the challenge is
nonetheless substantively briefed Accordingly, we
hold that the Putative Father challenged the Motion
to Strike, therefore, the Putative Father's arguments
on appeal are not moot
II THE PUTATIVE FATHER FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES
*5 [6]K 24 The Adoptive Parents contend that the
Putative Father failed to preserve a due process
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challenge and an equal protection challenge in the
district court They are correct
[7]U 25 The preservation requirement is found in
rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Piocedure, which provides, in relevant part, that for
each issue raised on appeal, an appellant's brief
must include a "citation to the record showing that
the issue was preserved in the trial court, or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
TN10
preserved in the trial court "
To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised "a
timely and specific objection" before the trial
court
We will not address an issue if it is not
preserved or if the appellant has not established
FN12
other grounds for seeking review
K 26 Rather than advancing grounds upon which we
may review an unpreserved issue, the Putative
Father argues that he preserved in the trial court all
of the issues that he raises on appeal The Putative
Father's brief makes the following statement regarding preservation "The issues raised in this
brief were preserved by appellant's documents filed
in the district court, including his Petition and Motion to Intervene, and by the issues discussed by the
district court m its Ruling on Motion to Intervene
and Motion to Dismiss, dated April 17,
2007 "While the brief does not match record citations with specific issues raised,
it does at
least reference documents wherein the issues
should be found
K 27 Reviewing the documents cited by the Putative
Father, we conclude that the Putative Father did not
preserve a due process challenge or an equal protection challenge The Natural Father's Objection
and Motion to Intervene as Respondent raises the
following arguments (1) the Putative Father complied with Utah's statute that sets guidelines for outof-state putative fathers to establish their parental
rights, and (2) he complied with the Arizona requirements for putative fathers to establish their
parental rights In its ruling, the district court addressed the following issues (1) whether the Birth
Mother's affidavits should be barred, (2) whether
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full faith and credit should be given to Arizona's
statement of paternity, and (3) whether the Putative
Father complied with the Utah requirements for
out-of-state putative fathers to establish paternity
rights It is clear from our review that neither the
Putative Father's challenges nor the district court's
rulings consider a due process or equal protection
challenge Accordingly, we will not address these
issues on appeal
III THE PUTATIVE FATHER DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH
CODE SECTION 78-30-4 14
U 28 Before a putative father may establish the right
to contest an adoption in Utah, he must meet the requirements outlined in Utah Code section
78-30-4 14 (Supp2005) One such requirement is
that the putative father register with the Utah Office
FN 14
of Vital Statistics
The statute includes an exception to this requirement, however, if the following circumstances are satisfied (1) the putative
father "resides and has resided in another state
where the unmarried mother was also located or
resided," (2) "the mother left that state without notifying or informing the unmarried biological father
that she could be located in the state of Utah," (3)
the putative father "through every reasonable
means, attempted to locate the mother but does not
know or have reason to know that the mother is
residing in the state of Utah," and (4) the putative
father "has complied with the most stringent and
complete requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was located, in order to
protect and preserve his parental interest and right
in the child in cases of adoption "
*6 ^ 29 The Putative Father admits that he did not
comply with the statute's general requirements, but
he contends that he qualified for the exception The
district court ruled that the Putative Father did not
qualify for the exception because he (1) did not
comply " 'with the most stringent and complete' "
Arizona requirements " 'in order to protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the child in
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cases of adoption,' " and (2) he knew or had reason
to know that the Birth Mother could be located in
Utah We address both of the district court's findings in turn
A The Putative Father Failed to Comply with the
Most Stringent and Complete Aruona Requirements
[8]K 30 The district court reasoned that the Putative
Father did not comply with the most stringent and
complete Arizona requirements established in Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106(G) because he
did not initiate a paternity action within thirty days
of receiving notice that the Birth Mother intended
FN16
to give B G S up for adoption
Anzona Revised Statute section 8-106(G) provides, in relevant
part, that each potential father shall be served notice of the planned adoption, and the notice shall inform the potential father that his ' failure to file a
paternity action pursuant to title 25, chapter 6, article 1,"
"within thirty days of completion of
service"
of the notice presc nbed by this section, "bars the potential father from bringing or
maintaining any action to assert any interest in the
child " F N W
U 31 The Putative Father argues that this language
does not actually impose any time limits on putative fathers because the language is couched in
terms of a requirement that the birth mother include
the language in her notice to the pulative father He
further contends that, for policy reasons, the statute
cannot possibly bar a putative father from establishing paternity at any time, otherwise if the birth
mother decided not to place the baby for adoption,
the putative father would be "off the hook for child
support "Finally, he argues that the notice he received was ambiguous and therefoie did not actually put him on notice of a mandatory thirty-day
limit to initiate a paternity action
[9][10][11]U 32 The Putative Father's interpretation
of the statute is unpersuasive because it produces an
absurd result and contradicts the plain language of
the statute When we interpret a stamte, " 'we look
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first to the statute's plain language to determine its
FN20
meaning ' "
We read the plain language of a
statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other provisions in the same statute
and with other statutes under the same and related
FN21
chapters
We seek an interpretation that
renders all parts of a statute "relevant and meaningful, and interpretations are to be avoided which
render some part of a provision nonsensical or ab, „FN22
surd
Tf 33 Contrary to the Putative Father's contention, it
would be absurd for the Arizona legislature to require a birth mother to give a putative father notice
that he had only thirty days to initiate a paternity
action but then give the putative father unlimited
time to initiate the action Such a result would
render meaningless the provision m the required
notice section Further, the language of section
8-106 is plain and unambiguously requires a putative father to initiate a paternity action within thirty
days of receiving notice of a planned adoption, otherwise, he has no right to contest the adoption This
interpretation is not refuted by policy, as the Putative Father contends Limiting the time in which a
putative father may establish the right to contest an
adoption does not limit the putative father's financial obligations with respect to that child if the birth
mother chooses not to place the child for adoption
Section 8-106 regards only the right to contest an
adoption, not any other rights or obligations that a
putative father may have regarding his child
*7 \ 34 The Putative Father's final argument, that
the notice he received was ambiguous, is incorrect
and irrelevant He argues that two paragraphs in the
notice "contradict each other about whether the
[Putative Father] must or may initiate a paternity
proceeding in order to establish interest in the
child "We hold that the text of the notice was unambiguous In one place the notice did read that the
Putative Father "may" initiate a paternity action,
and, in another place, it stated that the Putative
Father "must" initiate the action within thirty days
in order to retain a right to contest the adoption
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This language is not ambiguous, it simply clarifies
that it is not necessary for the Putative Father to initiate a paternity action if he does not desire to do
so However, if he does desire to, then he must do
so within thirty days Even if the notice were ambiguous, the notice included the text of the statute,
which indicated that the father must initiate a paternity action within thirty days of receipt of the notice in order to establish the right to contest the adoption Further, when the Putative Father registered
with the Arizona vital statistics office, he again received the text of the statute Therefore, the Putative Father had sufficient notice of the requirement
to initiate a paternity action within thirty days of receipt of the notice of a planned adoption
Tf 35 We uphold the district court's finding that the
Putative Father failed to comply with the most
stringent and complete Arizona requirements The
Putative Father failed to initiate a paternity action
within thirty days of receiving notice of a planned
adoption, as required by section 8-106
B The Putative Father Knew or Had Reason to
Know That the Birth Mother was in Utah
[12]f 36 The district court reasoned that the Putative Father knew or had reason to know that the
Birth Mother was in Utah because, at a protective
order hearing that was held less than thirty days before B G S was born, the Birth Mother's attorney
stated that the Birth Mother "went to Utah to get
away from [the Putative Father], and be up there,
and that's where she is " The Putative Father responded, "Yes, um [the Birth Mother] told me
when she moved to Utah "We will overturn a district court's findings of fact only if they are "clearly
erroneous "
[13]K 37 The Putative Father argues that he did not
know that the Birth Mother was in Utah because he
received an e-mail from the Birth Mother one week
following the protective order hearing stating that
she had not moved to Utah To discredit the attorney's statement made at the protective order hear-
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ing, the Putative Father argues, "no reasonable unmarried father, seeking to vindicate his paternity
rights, would base his actions on the representations
of the attorney for a woman who has obtained an
order of protection against him."He also argues that
he did not know where the Birth Mother was living
because the protective order prevented him from
contacting her.
*8 K 38 Again, the Putative Father's arguments are
unpersuasive. Utah Code section 78-30-4.14 requires only that a putative father "have reason to
know" that a birth mother was residing in Utah, not
that he have actual knowledge. In open court, the
Putative Father testified that the Birth Mother told
him that she had moved to Utah. This statement is
sufficient for the district court to find that the Putative Father had reason to know that the Birth Mother
was in Utah. Although the Birth Mother stated a
week later in an e-mail to the Putative Father that
she had not moved to Utah, the Putative Father still
had reason to believe she was in Utah because she
had previously told him that she was there, her attorney told him that she was there, and the Birth
Mother's statement that she had not "moved" to
Utah did not necessarily mean that she was not
staying in Utah until the baby was born and placed
for adoption. For these reasons, the district court's
finding that the Putative Father had reason to know
that the Birth Mother was in Utah is not clearly erroneous.
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the Putative Father's unestablished right to contest
the adoption.
A. The District Court Committed Harmless Error
When It Failed to Give Full Faith and Credit to the
Arizona Paternity Order
K 40"Pursuant to the United States Constitution,
'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.'" " Specifically, we
"give full faith and credit to a declaration of paternity or denial of paternity effective in another state if
the declaration or denial has been signed and is otherwise in compliance with the law of the other
f f „FN26
state.
[14]U 41 The district court declined to give full
faith and credit to the Arizona paternity order because the district court found that "the Arizona
Court now recognizes that it lacked jurisdiction,"
and "[t]his Court, not the State of Arizona, has exclusive jurisdiction
regarding custody of
[B.G.S.]." FN27
[15][161K 42 As to matters of jurisdiction, a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit "if the same
issue as to jurisdiction was raised in the foreign
FN2 8
court and adjudicated therein."
" In this case, the
Arizona court did take testimony and consider its
jurisdiction. The Arizona court stated as follows in
its order:

IV. THE ARIZONA PATERNITY ORDER DOES
NOT IMPACT THIS CASE BECAUSE IT WAS
UNTIMELY TO ESTABLISH THE PUTATIVE
FATHER'S RIGHT TO CONTEST THE ADOPTION

After discussion with the parties present, the
Court elicits testimony under oath on the record
in open court that the minor child ... does not
reside in the state of Arizona and has not resided
in the state of Arizona for the past six (6) months.

TI 39 The Putative Father argues that "the Arizona
Order of Paternity prevents the adoption of B.G.S.
without the [Putative Father's] permission" and that
the district court erred in not giving full faith and
credit to the paternity order. We hold that the district court did err, but the error was harmless because the Arizona paternity order has no impact on

*9 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-1031, this Court does
not have jurisdiction to determine custody at this
time.
(Emphasis added.)
\ 43 However, the Arizona court did not find that it
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lacked jurisdiction to issue a paternity order, rather
the court stated that the Voluntary Petition for Order of Paternity "resolv[es] the paternity issue "
The court then ordered the matter transferred to
Utah "for all further proceedings " A lack of jurisdiction as to a custody determination does not
equate to a lack of jurisdiction as to a paternity determination A "child custody determination" is
"any judgment, decree or other order of a court, including a permanent, temporary, initial and modification order, for legal custody, physical custody
or visitation with respect to a child "
A determination that an individual is the biological father of a child is not a determination that the biological father has custody or visitation rights with respect to that child Accordingly, the Arizona court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine
custody but not to determine paternity
[17][18]f 44 Being aware that the Arizona court
had itself concluded that it had jurisdiction, the
Utah district court erred m addressing the question
of whether the Arizona court, in fact, had jurisdiction However, the error was harmless "
'[Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings '
FN30
"
In this case, the district court's error in declining to grant the Arizona paternity order full
faith and credit was harmless because the order has
no bearing on the Putative Father's right to contest
the adoption of B G S
B The Arizona Paternity Order Has No Impact on
the Putative Father's Right to Contest the Adoption
ofBGS
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of the planned adoption in order to establish the
FN31
right to contest an adoption
If the putative
father fails to initiate a paternity action within the
time specified, then he is barred "from bringing or
maintaining any action to assert any interest in the
child "
This language is found within the statute entitled, "Consent to adoption, who shall consent, waiver, consent to the release of information,
notification to potential fathers "
[19]^| 47 The Putative Father argues that because
the Arizona court, having jurisdiction to do so, issued an order declaring him to be B G S 's father,
he need not meet the thirty-day requirement This is
not the case This interpretation of Arizona law
would render the thirty-day requirement meaningless Under Arizona law, the right to contest paternity is distinct from the right to contest an adoption
A putative father may establish paternity at any
time, but he may only establish the right to contest
an adoption if (1) he initiates a paternity action
withm thirty days of receiving notice of a planned
adoption and (2) that action results in a paternity
order
*10 f 48 Accordingly, we can consistently give full
faith and credit to the Arizona paternity order, but
nevertheless hold that the Putative Father did not
establish the right to contest the adoption of
FN34
BGS
In failing to give the paternity order
full faith and credit, the district court committed error But that error was harmless because the paternity order alone is insufficient to establish the right
to contest the adoption
V THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FAILING TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

% 45 We hold that a declaration of paternity from
Arizona does not necessarily establish the right to
contest an adoption in Arizona Rather, the right to
contest an adoption is a more narrow right that must
be established through specified means

[20]K 49 The Putative Father contends that the district court erred in finding facts without holding an
evidentiary hearing

1f 46 In Arizona, a putative father must initiate a paternity action within thirty days of receiving notice

f 50 Pursuant to rule 43(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedme, "[w]hen a motion is based on facts
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not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties,
but the court may direct that the matter be heard
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions "
T| 51 In this case, the court provided the parties the
opportunity to present evidence On February 2,
2007, the district court held a hearing on the matter
Counsel for the Putative Father requested that the
matter be argued only on the law and objected to an
evidentiary argument The court declined to determine what type of hearing would be held and left
the matter up to counsel At the hearing, the parties
did not present any evidence The Putative Father
was present, but his counsel did not call him to
testify Subsequently, the court relied on facts in
the record to make its findings
^ 52 We hold that the district court did not err in
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing The court
provided the parties an opportunity to present evidence, but counsel for the Putative Father declined
Further, the court relied only on facts in the record
to make its findings
VI THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S APPEAL IS NOT
FRIVOLOUS
If 53 The Adoptive Parents argue that the Putative
Father's "appeal is frivolous as it is not grounded "The Adoptive Parents base their argument on
the following claims (1) the Putative Father's claim
is moot because he only challenged one of two dispositive orders, (2) the Putative Father makes arguments on appeal that he failed to preserve, (3) the
Putative Father challenges findings of fact without
fully marshaling the evidence that supports those
findings, (4) the Putative Father ignores the essential fact he admitted to the court at the protective
order heanng-that he knew the Birth Mother went
to Utah, and (5) the Putative Father challenges the
lack of an evidentiary hearing when it was counsel
for the Putative Father who declined an evidentiary
hearing
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[2\]% 54 The Adoptive Parents' arguments fail to
establish that the Putative Father filed a frivolous
claim A frivolous claim under rule 33(b) of the
Utah Rules ot Appellate Piocedure"is one that i>
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law,
or not based on a good faith aigument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law "We address each
of the Adoptive Parents' arguments in turn
*11 TI 55 First, the Putative Father did challenge the
substance of both the Motion to Strike and the Mo
tion to Dismiss, therefore his claim is not moot
Second, although the Putative Father failed to pre
serve two of the issues that he raises on appeal, he
still raises other issues that are properly before u>
for consideration Third, the Adopiive Parents have
not developed a marshaling argument, and failure
to marshal is not included in nib $3(b)'s definition
of a frivolous appeal Fourth, the Putative Father
has admitted that he stated at the protective order
hearing that he knew, at the tims, that the Birth
Mother was in Utah He contends, however, that he
did not know or have reason to know the Birth
Mother was actually in Utah because following the
protective order hearing the Birth Mother sent him
an e-mail wherein she stated that she had not
moved to Utah While this may not be a strong ar
gument, it does not appear to be a bad faith argu
ment, especially in light of the fact that the Putative
Father has submitted the e-mail for the court's re
view
H 56 Finally, the Putative Father's challenge to the
lack of an evidentiary hearing does not appear to be
made in bad faith The Putative Father contends
that the district court ruled on facts that the Putative
Father did not know were in dispute Particularly,
the district court found that the copy of the Arizona
Paternity Order submitted by the Putative Fathei
was not properly certified The Putative Father ar
gues on appeal that the district court should have
provided him an opportunity to submit evidence re
garding the validity of the Order before the court
ruled on the Order This appears to be a good faith
argument, although it is irrelevant because, as wc
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have stated earlier, the validity of the order has no
bearing on the outcome of the case.

FN4. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, f 7, 191
P.3d4.

H 57 Accordingly, we hold that the Putative Father's
appeal is not frivolous, even though we uphold the
district court's decision.

FN5. Glew v. Ohio Saw Bank, 2007 UT 56,
H 18, 181 P.3d791.
FN6. In re Adoption of S.L.F., 2001 UT
App 183,1[9, 27 P.3d 583.

CONCLUSION
f 58 We affirm the district court's decision. Specifically, we hold that (1) the appeal is not moot because the Putative Father challenged the substance
of the two motions; (2) the due process issue and
the equal protection issue are not properly before us
because the Putative Father failed to preserve them;
(3) the Putative Father failed to comply with Utah
Code section 78-30-4.14; (4) the district court committed harmless error when it declined to give the
Arizona Paternity Order full faith and credit; (5) the
district court provided the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing; and, finally, (6) the Putative Father's appeal is not frivolous.

FN7. This statute has been renumbered and
revised since the proceedings of this case.
Throughout this opinion, we apply the
2005 version of the statute.
FN8. Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp, 656 P.2d
409, 410 (Utah 1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
FN9. The Adoptive Parents claim that the
Putative Father falsely asserted that he did
not know that the Birth Mother was in
Utah when in fact he did know she was in
Utah.
FN1 O.Utah
(2008).

K 59 Affirmed.
H 60 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice WILKINS,
Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in
Associate Chief Justice DURRANT's opinion.
FN1. At first blush, these statements appear contradictory-the natural father is unknown, yet he received actual notice of the
Birth Mother's move to Utah. They are reconcilable, however. Because the Birth
Mother was having sexual relations with
two different men around the time she became pregnant, she was unsure which man
was the natural father. Because she gave
both men actual notice of her move to
Utah, it is accurate to state that the
"unknown" father received "actual" notice
of the Birth Mother's move to Utah.

R.App.

P.

24(a)(5)(A)-(B)

FN11. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, % 17, 192
P.3d 867 (emphasis omitted) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
FN 12. Id. H 19 ("When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, we will address
the issue only if (1) the appellant establishes that the district court committed
plain error, (2) exceptional circumstances
exist, or (3) in some situations, if the appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the
issue."(citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).

FN2. 2008 UT App 152, 184 P.3d 1239.

FN13. The record citation is not at all helpful because it encompasses the entire record.

FN3.MH 10.

FN14.Utah

Code
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(2008)
FN1S Id § 78-30-4 15(4)(a)-(d)

FN27 The district court also found two
more problems with the order

FN 16 Ariz Rev Stat § 8-106(G) (2005)
FN 17 A/ $8-106(G)(7)
FN 18 Id § 8-106(G)(3) (emphasis added)
FN19W § 8-106(G)(7), see also id §
8-106(I)(8) (suggesting that the birth mother include the following language in the
notice to the putative father "If you do not
file a paternity action under title 25,
chapter 6, article 1, Arizona Revised Statutes, and do not serve the mother within
thirty days after completion of the service
of this notice and pursue the action to
judgment, you cannot bring or maintain
any action to assert any interest in the
child ")
FN20 Oman v Davis Sch Dist, 2008 UT
70, f 35, 194 P3d 956 (quoting State v
Gallegos 2007 UT 81, 1 12, 171 P 3d
426)

First, the court found that the order was
a "nullity" because it was issued after
the Birth Mother relinquished her rights
to B G S , and, accordingly the Putative
Father lost any right to contest the adoption We agree The paternity order was
a "nullity" as it pertains to whether the
Putative Father may contest the adoption
of B G S However, that determination
does not mean that we decline to give
the order full faith and credit As our
analysis indicates, the right to establish
paternity is a separate and distinct right
from the right to contest an adoption
The establishment of paternity is only
one of many requirements that a putative
father must satisfy before he establishes
the right to contest an adoption In this
case, the Putative Father failed to meet
the additional requirements, therefore it
is irrelevant whether he was able to establish paternity

FN21 Id
FN22 Robinson v Mount Logan Clinic,
LLC, 2008 UT 21, \ 9, 182 P 3d 333
(citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)
FN23 Section 8-106 is entitled, "Consent
to adoption, who shall consent, waiver,
consent to the release of information, notification to potential fathers "
FN24 Glen v Ohio Sav Bank, 2007 UT
56,1, 18, 181 P 3d 791
FN25 Mori v Mori, 931 P 2d 854, 856
(Utah 1997) (quoting U S Const art IV, §
1).
FN26Utah

Code Ann

$ 78B-15-310

Second, the district court stated that the
order does not "solicit [ ] judicial confidence" for a myriad of tec hnical reasons
Specifically, the court was concerned
that the order was not executed by a
judge, the copy provided to the Utah
court was not certified, the copy was
handwritten by the Birth Mother, and the
order was amended by the Arizona court,
but the Putative Father failed to present
the amended order to ihe district court
None of the reasons stated by the district
court is supported by evidence that the
order failed to comply with Arizona law,
which is the only requirement we must
consider in a full faith and credit analysis Rule 58(a) of the Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure requires only that, "all
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judgments shall be in writing and signed
by a judge or a court commissioner duly
authorized to do so "The Paternity Order
m this case was in writing and signed by
the deputy clerk No one has argued that
a deputy clerk is not authorized to sign
an order Further, no other Arizona requirements have been brought before us
Accordingly, we conclude that the Arizona requirements have been met
FN28 In re Complaint Against Smith 925
P 2d 169, 172 (Utah 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
FN29 Ariz Rev Stat
(Supp 2008)

§

25-l002(3)(a)

The Adoptive Parents look to Arizona
Revised Statute sections 25-1031 and
25-1002 to argue that the Arizona court
lacked jurisdiction to issue the paternity
order Section 25-103l(A)(l)-(2) states
that Arizona does not have jurisdiction
to "make an initial child custody determination" unless Arizona is the child's
home state, and a court of another state
does not have jurisdiction over the child
Section 25-1002(4) defines "child custody proceeding" as "a proceeding, including a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental
rights and protection from domestic violence, in which legal custody, physical
custody or visitation with respect to a
child is an issue or in which that issue
may appear "(Emphasis added ) Thus,
the adoptive parents argue that when the
Arizona court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to determine custody, it was also
stating that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate paternity because a custody proceeding is statutorily equivalent to a paternity proceeding However, the jurisdictional statute regards a "child custody
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determination," not a proceeding Ariz Rev Stat ^ 25-1031(A) Further, the
definition of a "child custody determination" does not incorporate a paternity determination a child custody determination is "any judgment, decree or other
order of a court, including a permanent,
temporary, initial and modification order, for legal custody, physical custody
or visitation with respect to a child "Id %
25-1002(3)(a) Therefore, a lack of jurisdiction over a custody determination
does not equate to a lack of jurisdiction
over a paternity determination
FN30 State \ Spilleis 2007 UT 13, % 24,
152 P 3d 315 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v Evans 2001 UT 22, \ 20,
20 P 3d 888)
FN31 Ariz Rev Stat § 8-106(G)(3) (2005)
FN32W $8-106(G)(6)
FN33 Id §8-106
FN34 This situation should not arise in
Utah because here, "a declaration of paternity may not be signed or filed after
consent to or relinquishment for adoption
has been signed "Utah Code Ann §
78B-15-302(8) (2008)
Utah,2009
HUF v WPW
... P3d — , 2009 WL 304711 (Utah), 623 Utah
Adv Rep 14, 2009 UT 10
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM 2

Any portion of this Agreement which may be prohibited or unenforceable in any applicable
jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or
unenforceability, but shall not invalidate the remaining portions of such provisions or the other
provisions hereof or affect any such provisions or portion thereof in any other jurisdiction.
Captions.
The headings of the sections in this Agreement are intended solely for convenience of reference and
are not intended and shall not be deemed for any purpose whatsoever to modify or explain or place
constriction upon any of the provisions of this Agreement
Governing Law.
The Parties hereto agree that this Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah
without regard to the conflicts of law principles. The Parties further agree that exclusive jurisdiction
and venue to enforce this Agreement shall be in a state or federal court of appropriate jurisdiction in
Utah.
Counterparts.
This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which will be deemed an
original but all of which together will constitute one and the same document.
Entire Agreement.
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto pertaining to the subject
matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the
Parties, and there are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in
connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein. No supplement,
modification, amendment, waiver or termination of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed
in writing and signed by the Parties hereto. This Agreement does not supersede, modify or affect
the Distributor Agreement or the PoUcies and Procedures and MARIN will be bound separately by
those agreements.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have duly executed this Agreement on the date first written

9

ADDENDUM 3

Westlavu
Slip Copy
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2927768 (D Utah)
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2927768 (D.Utah))
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A. Background

H
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available
United States District Court,
D Utah,
Central Division
SLICEX, INC , Plaintiff,
v
AEROFLEX COLORADO SPRINGS, INC , f/k/a
Aeroflex UTMC Microelectronic Systems, Inc ,
Defendant
Civil No. 2:04 CV 00615TS.
Oct 11,2006
Jerome Romero, Timothy C Houpt, Ryan M Harris, Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, Salt
Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff
David J Jordan, Aaron T Brogdon, David L
Mortensen, Stoel Rives, Salt Lake City, UT, Lonnie
Coleman, Kramer Coleman Wactlar & Lieberman,
Jericho, NY, Raymond M Deeny, N Dawn
Webber, Sherman & Howard, Colorado Springs,
CO, for Defendant

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
TED STEWART, District Judge
*1 This matter was tried before the Court on July
18 through 21, 2006, the Honorable Ted Stewart
presiding With regard to plaintiff SliceX, Inc fs
("SliceX") second claim for relief, the Court, having reviewed the evidence, listened to the testimony, and heard the arguments presented by the
parties, and being fully advised in this matter,
hereby enters the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law
I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1 SliceX is a Utah corporation that has at all times
relevant to this dispute been in the business of
providing analog and mixed-signal design services
(Trial Transcript ("Transcript") at 91 7-11 )
2 Defendant Aeroflex Colorado Springs, Inc
("Aeroflex") is a Colorado-based corporation in the
business of designing and developing mixed-signal
integrated circuits (Id at 270 1-23 )
3 Aeroflex contracts with various customers for the
design and fabrication of mixed signal circuits (See
Transcript at 271 16-272 7 )
4 Aeroflex at times contracts with outside engineering firms to secure engineering services (Id at
272 8-12 )Aeroflex relies on a combination of those
outside contract engineers and its own m-house engineering resources to meet the contractual deadlines set by its customers (Id at 273 3-18 )Relying
on outside contract engineers is often necessary to
avoid overstaffing during non-peak periods but carries with it certain disadvantages, such as higher
cost and diminished control over the pace and progress of the work (See id)
B. The Parties' Duties and Performance under
the Agreements
5 In order to meet contractual obligations to customers, Aeroflex engaged SliceX to provide certain
engineering services under three consulting agreements dated (a) November 1, 2002, (b) February
12, 2003, and (c) October 23, 2003, (collectively,
the "Agreements") (See Trial Exs 1, 3, 5)
6 In the Agreements, SliceX agreed to provide specified engineering services, and Aeroflex agreed to
pay SliceX for the services provided in accordance
with the rates set forth in the Agreements (See
id) Specifically, the Agreements described the
parties' agreed-upon performances as follows
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a In the November 1, 2002 Agreement

MC's own benefit or for the benefit of any other
person or entity

1) Services and Compensation
a) ShceX, Inc agrees to perform for UTMC the services described in Attachment I ("Services")
b) The UTMC agrees to pay ShceX, Inc the compensation set forth m Attachment I for the performance of the Services
b In the February 12, 2003 Agreement
1) Services and Compensation
a) ShceX, Inc agrees to perform for AEROFLEX
UTMC the services described in Attachment I
("Development Work")
b) The AEROFLEX UTMC agrees to pay ShceX,
Inc the compensation set forth in Attachment I for
the performance of the Development Work
c In the October 23, 2003 Agreement
1) Services and Compensation

b The February 12, 2003 Agreement provided as
follows
AEROFLEX UTMC agrees that AEROFLEX UTMC shall not, for a period of three years immediately following the termination of this agreement,
whether directly or indirectly
(b) solicit or take
away, or attempt to solicit or take away, any employee of ShceX, Inc , either for AEROFLEX UTMC's own benefit or for the benefit of any other
person or entity
c Finally, the October 23, 2003 Agreement
provided as follows
AEROFLEX agrees not to solicit or entice (other
than normal employment discussions not initiated
by AEROFLEX) for employment any of the current
employees of ShceX for purposes of hiring such
employee during the period of this Agreement and
for a period of one year thereafter, without the prior
written consent of ShceX

a) ShceX, Inc agrees to perform for AEROFLEX
the services described in Attachment I
("Development Work")

14)

*2 AEROFLEX agrees to pay ShceX, Inc the compensation set forth in Attachment I for the performance of the Development Work

2 Each of the Agreements also provided that Aeroflex was permitted to terminate the respective
agreement for any or no reason upon giving notice
to ShceX (See Trial Ex 1 at U 6(b), Trial Ex 3 at 1)
7(b), Trial Ex 5 at K 6(b))

(Trial Exs 1,3,5 at H 1 )
7 The Agreements also contained express terms
governing Aeroflex's conduct with regard to the
hiring of individuals working for ShceX

(Trial Ex 1 at \ 4, Trial Ex 3 at \ 5, Trial Ex 5 at

3 Aeroflex fully performed under the Agreements,
it paid for all of the services pro\ ided by ShceX
(See, e g, Transcript at 200 5-201 c>)

a The November 1, 2002 Agreement provided as
follows

C. Aeroflex's Decision to Open a Grass Valley
Facility

UTMC agrees that UTMC shall not, for a period of
three years immediately following the termination
of this agreement, whether directly or indirectly
(b) solicit or take away, or attempt to solicit or take
away, any employee of ShceX, Inc , either for UT-

4 In 2003, Aeroflex learned that SliceX was exper
lencing significant financial difficalties and losing
many of its employees (Id at 285 \3-2Q,see also
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting De
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fendant's Rule 52(c) Motion (the "Order") at 11.)
SliceX had furloughed several Grass Valley employees, had placed the rest on 50% salary, and was
adjusting some employees' salaried/hourly status to
reduce its payroll expenses. (Transcript at
155:24-156:1, 387-88, 413:20-414:2, 415:19-416:8,
448:16-18, 452:14-20, 469:12-19; Trial Exs. B, E.)
From time to time, SliceX missed its payroll and
failed to reimburse its employees in a timely fashion for work-related expenses. (Id. at 391:10-22,
413:24-414:2, 415:8-15, 471:4-472:8.)As a result,
the majority of SliceX's Grass Valley engineers left
for other employment between the summer of 2003
and early spring of 2004. (Id. at 157-159,
390-9Usee also id. at 180:6-9.)
*3 5. Upon learning of SliceX's problems, Aeroflex
grew concerned that SliceX might become unable
to complete the services it had agreed to perform,
potentially causing Aeroflex to miss its own contractual deadlines. (See Transcript at 285:13-20;
Order at 11.)
6. As a result, Aeroflex was forced to consider alternative means of satisfying its contractual obligations with regard to the contracts for which it had
retained SliceX's services. (See Transcript at
286:5-23; Trial Ex. 15 at 1; Order at 11.) Specifically, Aeroflex began exploring the possibility of
opening its own design facility in Grass Valley,
California, either by acquisition or by assembling
its own design team. (See Transcript at 286:5-23;
Trial Ex. 15 at 1; Order at 11.)
7. After considering its options, Aeroflex concluded
that continuing to depend on SliceX was too risky
and would not give Aeroflex an acceptable level of
control over the pace of the work. (See Transcript at
285:8-20, 286:24-287:7, 290:19-23; Trial Ex. 15.)
Aeroflex decided that its best course of action was
to establish its own design facility to ensure that it
could meet its contractual deadlines. (Id. at 287:1-7,
290:14-18, 291:1-4; Order at 12.)
D. Aeroflex's Hiring of Former SliceX Employ-
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ees
8. Thereafter, Aeroflex ran a series of job postings
on Monster.com beginning in late 2003 and running
through the spring of 2004. (Transcript at 300-301;
Order at 12.)
9. Among other applicants, four individuals who
were then working for SliceX, Jackie Snyder
("Snyder"), Steve Levy ("Levy"), David Rosky
("Rosky"), and Tom Grundy ("Grundy"), responded to Aeroflex's Monster.com posting and/or inquired about positions with Aeroflex. (Transcript at
305:13-306:17, 392:11-19, 424:8-11, 473:19-24;
Order at 12.)
10. SliceX's financial problems had led Snyder to
look for new employment, and she found and responded to Aeroflex's February 2004 Monster.com
advertisement in the course of her job search.
(Transcript at 392:5-16.) No one directed her to
Aeroflex's job posting. (Id. at 392:17-19.)Aeroflex
did not inform her of the posting or solicit her application, and no one at Aeroflex asked her to recruit others to work at Aeroflex. (Id. at 394:1-3,
395:25-396:2.)After reviewing her application,
Aeroflex interviewed Snyder, but she withdrew
from consideration after deciding to accept employment at Intel. (Id. at 395:6-24.)
11. Levy had also decided to look for alternative
employment due to SliceX's financial struggles.
(Transcript at 421:15-422:10.) He conducted his
search by talking to friends in the industry, and as
part of his search, he went to Monster.com to explore possible opportunities in his area. (Id. at
422-24.)While prospecting on Monster.com, Levy
found Aeroflex's posting and submitted an electronic application. (Id. at 424:8-11; Trial Ex. Ul.) Levy
interviewed with Aeroflex and eventually accepted
a position. (Id. at 425:20-23.)Levy found Aeroflex's
Monster.com job posting on his own; no one at
Aeroflex informed him of or directed him to the
posting. (Id. at 306:2-9, 428:7-12.)Aeroflex did not
solicit Levy to apply and did not request that he recruit or inform others of the opportunity after he
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had applied (Id at 428 7-14, 429 6-12 )
*4 12 ShceX's financial struggles also led Rosky,
Levy's longtime personal friend, to seek new employment in early 2004
(Transcript at
452 21-453 7, 16-17) Over the course of several
months, Levy and Rosky discussed their respective
job searches, and upon learning that Levy had applied for a position at Aeroflex, Rosky contacted
David Kerwin ("Kerwin"), Aeroflex's Director of
Mixed-Signal Products, to inquire about the possibility of working for Aeroflex as an independent
consultant (Id at 453 16-454 6 )Rosky initiated
this inquiry (Id at 454 9-15 )No one at Aeroflex
contacted him to solicit him (Id)
13 Finally, Grundy also decided to leave ShceX
due for compensation-related reasons (Transcript
at 473 15-18) Grundy's job search, like Snyder's
and Levy's, included searching Monster com for job
postings (Id at 473 20-24 )He also found Aeroflex's posting and submitted a resume electronically (Id at 473 25-474 4 )Grundy found Aeroflex's
posting with no prompting from anyone at Aeroflex, and no one at Aeroflex solicited him to seek
employment at Aeroflex prior to his submission of
a resume (Id at 473 20-474 2, 477 4-8 )Like
Rosky, Grundy eventually contracted with Aeroflex
as an independent consultant (Id at 478 6-8 )
14 Based on the evidence presented and testimony
heard, the Court finds that no one at Aeroflex told
Snyder, Levy, Rosky, or Grundy about Aeroflex's
Monster com posting, and no one at Aeroflex solicited these individuals for employment (See Transcript at 392 17-19, 394 1-3, 306 2-9, 428 7-12,
428 7-14, 429 6-12, 454 9-15, 473 20-474 2,
477 4-8, see also Order at 12 ) Rather, the Court
finds that each of these former ShceX employees
initiated employment discussions with Aeroflex by
either responding to the Monster com job posting or
contacting Aeroflex on his or her own, without assistance or prompting from anyone at Aeroflex
(See Transcript at 342 3-17, 392 17-19, 394 1-3,
428 7-14, 429 6-12, 477 4-8, see also Order at 12 )

15 Based on the evidence presented and testimony
heard, the Court finds that each of these four engin
eers initiated contact with Aeroflex and that Aer
oflex took no steps to solicit any of these former
ShceX employees (See Transcript at 342 3-17,
392 17-19, 394 1-3, 428 7-14, 429 6-12, 477 4-8,
Order at 12-13)
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Utah Law Imposes an Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
1 Under Utah law, every contract is deemed to in
elude an implied covenant of good faith and fan
dealing, which prevents each party to the contract
from " 'intentionally or purposely do[ing] anything
which will destroy or injure the oiher party's right
to receive the fruits of [the] contract' " St Bene
diet's Dev Co v St Benedict'* Hosp 811 P 2d
194, 199 (Utah 1991)
2 To succeed on a claim for breach of the implied
covenant, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
"intentionally or purposefully
de feat[ed] the [the
plaintiffs] expectations " Rawson v Conover, 20
P 3d 876, 885 (Utah 2001)
B. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Cannot Be Used to Impose New, Independent Duties upon Aeroflex.
*5 3 "While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, some general
principles limit the scope of the covenant" Oak
wood Village LLC v Albertsons, Inc, 2004 UT
101, \ 45, 104 P2d 1226 These include, but are
not limited to, the following
a "First, this covenant cannot be read to establish
new, independent rights or duties to which the
parties did not agree ex ante "Id (citing Brehanv v
Nordstiom, Inc, 812 P 2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991), see
also Seare v Umv of Utah Sch o) Med, 882 P 2d
673, 678 (Utah 1994), Sanderson v Fust Sec Leas-
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ing Co 844 P 2d 303, 308 (Utah 1992)
b "Second, this covenant cannot create rights and
duties inconsistent with express contractual terms "
OakMood Village 2004 UT 101 11 45, 104 P 2d
1226 (citing Btehany 812 P 2d at 55, Rio Algom
Coip \ Junto Ltd 618 P 2d 497, 505 (Utah
1980))
c "Finally, [courts] will not use this covenant to
achieve an outcome in harmony with the court's
sense of justice but inconsistent with the express
terms of the applicable contract "Id (citing Dal/on
\ Jenco Consti Co 642 P 2d 748, 750 (Utah
1982), see also Etme Haite Ford Inc v / ord Mo
tot Co 260 F3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir 2001) (The
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
"cannot override an express contractual term ")
4 In short, courts "will not interpret the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to make a
better contract for the parties than they made for
themselves Nor will [courts] construe the covenant
to establish new, independent rights or duties not
agreed upon by the parties " Mahbu In\ Co v
Sparks 2000 UT 30, \ 19, 996 P 2d 1043 (quoting
Btonn v Mooie 973 P 2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998))
(other citations omitted)
FNlSee also Seme 882 P 2d at 678
(citations omitted) (The implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is "implied
in contracts 'to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract '"), Rubin
v
Laser
703 N E 2d 453, 459
(111 Ct App 1998) ("[T]he doctrine of good
faith and fair dealing does not serve to import new obligations into a contract It
merely controls how the obligations stated
within the contract are to be performed "),
First v Allstate Ins Co 222 F Supp 2d
1165, 1172 (CDCal2002) ("Absent a
contractual right
the implied covenant
has nothing upon which to act as a supplement, and should not be endowed with an
existence independent of its contractual
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underpinnings"), Menpeco US4 Inc v
Snm Bank Corp 237 BR 12, 26
(S D N Y 1997) ("The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing does not
provide a court carte blanche to rewrite the
parties' agreement Thus, a court cannot
imply a covenant inconsistent with the
terms expressly set forth in the contract ")
5 The Court notes that courts in other jurisdictions
have also held that "a party which acts in accordance with rights expressly provided in a contract
cannot be held liable for breaching an implied covenant of good faith " Menpeco 237 B R at 26,^^
also An and Co Inc v Regent Intl Corp 273
F Supp 2d 518, 522 (S D N Y 2003) (A claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is "redundant where the conduct allegedly violating the implied covenant is also the
predicate for breach
of an express provision of
the underlying contract") (citations omitted), Flat
ris v Ptovident Lije & Accident Ins Co 310 F 3d
73, 81 (2d Cir 2002), Alter v Bogoncin 1997 WL
691332 at *7 (S D N Y 1997) The Court notes that
ShceX has failed to articulate any implied duty
owed by Aeroflex other than those expressly imposed under the parties' agreement Indeed, ShceX's
claim for breach of the implied covenant is predicated on the same factual averments that form the
basis of its breach of contract claim that Aeroflex
improperly solicited ShceX employees (See Complaint \ 20 (constituting ShceX's entire Second
Cause of Action "The conduct of Aeroflex as outlined above [in support of ShceX's breach of contract claim] has breached the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing implied in the Agreements "))
*6 6 Here, the parties' contractual rights and obligations were clearly defined in the Agreements
a The Agreements described the work to be done
by ShceX and specified the rate of compensation
due from Aeroflex (See Fact \ 2, Trial Exs 1,3,
5)
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b. The Agreements contained express provisions
governing the hiring of SliceX's employees by Aeroflex. (See Order at 4-7; Trial Ex. 1 at K 4; Trial Ex.
3 at K 5; Trial Ex. 5 at ^4.)
c. Aeroflex had the right to terminate the Agreements at any time upon giving notice to SliceX.
(See Fact % 4; Trial Ex. 1 at U 6(b); Trial Ex. 3 at %
7(b); Trial Ex. 5 at U 6(b).)
d. Aeroflex had no contractual obligation under the
Agreements to not open a competing design facility. (See Trial Exs. 1,3,5.)
e. Aeroflex had no duty to leave its design work
with SliceX beyond the terms of the Agreements or
to the derogation of its express right to terminate.
(See Trial Exs. 1,3,5.)
7. The Court may not impose duties on Aeroflex in
addition to those expressly provided in the Agreements.
C. Aeroflex Did Not Breach the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
8. Based on the evidence presented and testimony
heard at trial, the Court therefore finds that:
a. Aeroflex's retention of SliceX was "at will" under the Agreements, and SliceX's legal expectation
was to receive compensation for whatever design
services it performed.

pay and/or retain its employees justifiably generated concern on the part of Aeroflex.
e. SliceX had no legal expectation of additional
work from Aeroflex beyond the terms of the Agreements.
f. SliceX received its bargained-for consideration
and enjoyed the fruits of the Agreements. (See Fact
15.)
g. Aeroflex's posting of openings on Monster.com
did not breach the non-solicitation clauses of the
Agreements.
9. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes
that Aeroflex did not breach the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and that SliceX cannot prevail on its second claim for relief, which is
premised on the assertion that Aeroflex improperly
solicited individuals employed by SliceX.
10. Thus, judgment is hereby entered in Aeroflex's
favor on SliceX's claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that
claim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
D.Utah,2006.
Slicex, Inc. v. Aeroflex Colorado Springs, Inc.
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2927768 (D.Utah)
END OF DOCUMENT

b. Aeroflex fully performed its obligations under
the Agreements by paying SliceX in full for all services rendered and took no other actions to interfere
with SliceX's performance under the Agreements.
c. Because Aeroflex had the unfettered right to terminate the Agreements at will by giving notice,
SliceX understood that it might not be retained to
perform all of the work set forth in the Agreements.
(See Fact K 4; Trial Ex. 1 at % 6(b); Trial Ex. 3 at K
7(b); Trial Ex. 5 at f 6(b).)
d. SliceX's failure to generate sufficient business to
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